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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES HORNSBY,
Appellant-Plaintiff,
vs.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation sole,
CHARLES GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON,
and JOHN DOES I through X,
inclusive,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From
Third District Court,
Honorable Timothy Hanson
District Court Judge
No. C-83-5019
Utah Supreme Court
No. 860007
(Argument Priority No.

Respondents-Defendants.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was it reversible error for the trial court judge to

refuse to voir dire the jury on their interest in defendant LDS
Church?
2.

Was it reversible error to allow defense counsel to

refer to his client as the welfare farm?
3.

Was it reversible error for the trial court judge to

refuse to give an instruction on reg ipsa loquitur to the jury?
4.

Did the trial court judge commit reversible error by

refusing to give instructions to the jury on negligence per s_e?
5«

Did the trial court judge commit reversible error in

refusing to give a strict liability instruction in this case?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
This lawsuit was
damages

sustained

initiated

to recover personal injury

by plaintiff, James Hornsby

(hereinafter

referred to as Hornsby) when he laid down his motorcycle in
order to avoid hitting a cow that had escaped while defendant was
attempting to load livestock on a truck.

The case was heard

before Judge Timothy R. Hanson in Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, by a seven-person jury for a period of four days
(October 29 through November 1, 1985).

After fifty minutes of

deliberation, the jury found the defendants zero (0%) percent
negligent and plaintiff 100% negligent in causing the accident.
From that jury verdict and a judgment of no cause of action,
comes this appeal.
The_facts in material part are that on March 30, 1983, at
5:40 p.m., James Hornsby was operating his motorcycle easterly on
2820 South approximately 7975 West, City of Magna, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, when a cow, owned by defendant Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (hereinafter referred to as "LDS Church"), darted out from
behind a fence into his pathway.

(R. 822, 823.)

the cow (which he avoided by inches, R. 569),

To avoid hitting
Hornsby applied

his brakes and then laid down his bike in the road.

In doing so,

he incurred severe physical injuries.
The cow was one of two that had, earlier escaped from the
LDS Church welfare farm (R. 677) onto defendant John Sutton1 s
property.

The two cattle remained at the Sutton property during
2

March 1983 until their removal would not disturb Sutton1s cattle.
(R. 632, 643-646).

On March 30, 1983, the LDS Church agent,

Charles Giblett, went to retrieve the cattle.

Because the LDS

Church trailer was broken, they used Mr. Sutton1s horse trailer.
(R. 548.) Mr. Sutton had never before used his trailer to load
and/or transfer any cattle.

(R. 554.)

Before backing the trailer to the corral, Mr. Sutton opened
the only gate from his property leading to 2820 South.

The gate

was left open during the loading procedure for Mr. Sutton's
convenience.

(R. 553, 635.)

be loaded by chute.

The Sutton trailer was designed to

Mr. Sutton acknowledged that there would be

a smaller possibility of an animal escaping if the trailer had
been used as designed.

(R. 559.)

the trailer to the corral gate.
trailer.

He nonetheless chose to back

He then attached the gate to the

(R. 555, 557.)

Mr. Sutton used bailing wire to secure the trailer to the
corral gate during loading.
before its use.

He couldnft recall if he used a hook

(R. 599.)

on the gate to secure it.
how the cow escaped.

No inspection was made of the wire

Mr. Sutton expressed uncertainty as to

He did not express an opinion as to whether

the wire broke or merely came loose.

(R. 591, 596, 598.)

The

animal did escape, however, and gained access to the road, where
the accident took place, through the gate Mr. Sutton had left
open.

(R. 598.)

The cow had been loose for at least an hour before the
accident occurred.

(R. 612.)
3

During that hour there was no

organized plan to contain this cow other than to herd the cow
back across the road (2820 South) to Sutton's property.
584, 612.)

(R. 647,

While the cow was on and about the road, the acci-

dent occurred.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues that the jury verdict in this case was
against the undisputed evidence and should be overturned. The
trial court committed reversible error in rulings on a number of
issues to be discussed hereinafter.

First, the court refused to

allow voir dire of the jury concerning their potential prejudicial
involvements with the defendant church.

Second, the court allowed

defendant's counsel to refer to his client as the "welfare farm".
Finally, the judge refused plaintiff's proposed jury instructions
on re_s ipsa loquitor and negligence per se and strict liability.
The jury found the defendant zero (0%) negligent.

That verdict

goes against the evidence, shows the impact of the court's trial
errors, and is reversible as a matter of law.
That finding of 0% neglect on the part of the defendants is
clearly contrary to the evidence.

John Sutton admitted that he

used a horse trailer which he had never used to load cattle.
13.)

(T.

He testified further that he left the upper gate opened.

(T. 20.)

The fact is, a cow, under the supervision and control of

defendants, darted onto a public highway creating an undeniable
hazard.

The defendants had a duty to the plaintiff and others

rightfully operating their motor vehicles on a public road to keep
their livestock off the road.
•4

Failure to do so is negligence*

The plaintiff is not asking this Court to apportion negligence in this case.

This Court should find that the evidence did

not support the juryfs finding that the defendants were zero (0%)
percent negligent.

As a matter of law, the defendants were

negligent to the extent of some percentage.

The jury's apportion-

ment of negligence reflects the bias and prejudice which contaminated this trial and the ultimate verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE TO REFUSE TO VOIR DIRE THE JURY ON
MATTERS INVOLVING THEIR POTENTIALLY PREJUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DEFENDANT LDS
CHURCH.
It is a widely held principle that wherever a religious
organization is a party to the litigation, the religious faith of
the prospective juror is a proper subject of inquiry.

47 Am.

Jur. 2d, JuryLr Section 283.
In the Landmark case Casey vs. Roman Catholic Arch Bishop of
Baltimore, 143 A.2d 627 (MD. 1958), the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that in a jury trial, parties have an actual right to voir
dire prospective jurors on their religious affiliation if it is
"specific cause for disqualification".

Id. at 631.

Failure of

the court to allow such voir dire questioning is an abuse of
discretion constituting reversible error.
Even beyond initial questions regarding church affiliation,
the £&&££ court stated that:

5

. . . If the religious affiliation of a juror
might reasonably prevent him from arriving at
a fair and impartial verdict in a particular
case because of the nature of the case, the
parties are entitled to ferret it out or
preferably, have the court discover for them,
the existence of bias or prejudice resulting
from such affiliation* . •
A party is
entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying
bias or prejudice without exception and not
merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of a
general abstract nature.
(Miles vs. U.S.,
109 U.S. 304, 1881, Jurors asked if they
believed in the truth of Mormon teachings).
Id. at 631.

Plaintiff's counsel in the instant case should have

been allowed to voir dire the jury regarding their affiliation
with the defendant LDS church.

(Plaintiff's requested voir dire,

specifically numbers 38-45.)

(R. 325-328.)

Furthermore, to

ferret out any bias and prejudice, counsel should have been
allowed to question them regarding whether any attended the
Oquirrh Stake from where the cow came; whether any of them held
church positions, i.e. bishop; and/or whether any of them either
volunteered at the subject farm or knew persons who had or did.
Because of the large LDS Church population, the probability of
a juror holding a position of leadership in the Church is great.
Therefore, it was very likely that a juror would perceive that
plaintiff was suing "my Church".

The judge, therefore, committed

prejudicial error by refusing to make appropriate inquiry into
that potential perception.
Rather

than give the written instructions submitted by

counsel, the trial court judge herein gave a general instruction
to the effect as follows:

"Would any of you find it difficult to

be fair and impartial and render a judgment against defendant LDS

church?"

Out of the twenty-two prospective jurors, no one

responded when asked this question.

A more detailed probing as

requested would have at least given counsel the opportunity to
use peremptory challenges in a more considered manner.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ball 685 P. 2d 1055 (Utah
1984) held that this type of general question is insufficient.
The trial judge in Ball, having no juror response when asked
whether anyone had prejudices against people who drink, allowed
no further questioning on the matter.

Likewise, the prosecution

considered any further questions "superfluous".

In reversing the

trial court decision, the court aptly noted that "the most
characteristic feature of prejudice is its inability to recognize
itself".

Ld. at 1058.

The Ball court

recognized that a

peremptory challenge may be predicated on group affiliation.

The

basis for the M X l decision "the detection of actual bias", is
applicable here.

Id. at 1059.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in

United States v.

&££l££j£, 776 F2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985) found that the trial court
provided a fair trial when it allowed a forty-four page questionnaire to be submitted to the prospective jurors asking for
detailed information about, inter alia/ religious affiliation.
Affleck involved the prosecution of a defendant who had defrauded
persons affiliated with the Mormon Church.

Returning a guilty

verdict in Affleck would vindicate the rights of Mormons, and,
therefore, the defense counsel needed to ferret out religious bias
and prejudice against an accused.
7

Here, a verdict finding

liability

on the part of the defendants would be a finding

against the Mormon Church,
Besides knowing the defendant to be the LDS Church, the case
at hand contained several innuendos and references to the Church*
The following excerpts from the record demonstrate the type of
prejudicial information that infiltrated the trial.

"Mr. Sutton

was greatly disturbed that he had to be involved in a lawsuitf
and his "stake president" [emphasis added] told me that I should
call him and try to explain to him what the situation was and how
sorry we were that he was."

(R. 640); Mr. Sutton and Mr. Giblett

had a "church relationship". (R. 640.)

Further, there was a

reference to one of the "brethren" telling Giblett that Sutton had
called.

(R. 630.)

Appellant contends that the jury in this case was biased and
prejudiced in favor of the LDS Church and this is inferable from
the fact that after a four-day trial of a serious personal
injury case demanding damages in excess of $300,000, the jury only
deliberated fifty minutes (jury retired November 1, 1985 at 4:40
p.m. and gave verdict at 5:30 p.m.) and returned an insupportable
verdict finding the defendants were 0% negligent and appellant
100% negligent.

This was in the face of absolute evidence of

negligence on the part of each defendant.
POINT II
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS THE WELFARE
FARM.

8

It is a basic principle of American law that a party is
entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice
without exception*

The use of the word "welfare"r portraying an

apparently penniless defendant, obviously creates a bias in favor
of finding the defendant not liable*

Further an organization

with the apparent design to magnanimously alleviate the trials of
penniless and helpless creates an unjust sympathy factor in a
lawsuit such as this.

In this case Judge Hanson recognized the

likelihood of such bias and unjust sympathy.

He instructed

counsel in chambers not to refer to the fact that defendant is a
"welfare" institution.
referring
companies.

Plaintiff's counsel refrained from

to defendants as being

represented by insurance

Notwithstanding the admonishment, counsel introduced

his client Charles Giblett as the supervisor of the "Church
Welfare Farm" known as the Oquirrh Stake Farm.

(R. 544.)

Plaintiff's counsel did not object, as not to draw the jury's
attention to the "welfare" defendant.

But, for the record and to

prevent further references to "welfare", she brought the admonishment again to the attention of the parties and the Court.
Notwithstanding the prior order of the court counsel again, later
in the proceedings, brought the "welfare farm" notion to the
attention of the jury.

(R. 544.)

These references to the

"welfare farm" constitute reversible error!.
POINT III
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE TO REFUSE TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON RES
IPSA LOQUITUR.

9

Plaintiff's counsel requested the court to give a jury
instruction on £gs ipsa loguitor.

The court refused*

(R. 411.)

Recently this Court reiterated the following requirements plaintiff must satisfy to be entitled to an instructions on the theory
of L£§ ipsa loquitur:
1. That the accident was of a kind, in the
ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed;
2. That the plaintiff's own use or operation
of the agency or instrumentality was not
primarily responsible for the injury; and
3.
That the agency or instrumentality
causing the injury was under the exclusive
management or control of the defendant.
Kusv v, K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1230 (Dtah 1984).
The court in Kusy stated that it was only necessary for the
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing.

Kusy f,s prima facie

case was:
1.

Pallets were able to bear much greater weight than
his own which supported the inference that the
pallets would not have broken if due care had
been observed;

2.

He testified he loaded the truck in the normal
manner under manager's instructions and directions;
and

3*

Defendant had retrieved the pallets from its own yard
and brought them to the truck for plaintiff's use.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a res ipsa
loquitur

instruction.

The court, in so finding, stated if
10

plaintiff could prove that the pallet broke and caused the fall,
but could not point to a specific act that caused it to break,
then the res ipsa instruction could be appropriate.
The plaintiffs in this case did make the necessary prima
facie showing for Las ie&a loguitor as follows:
1.

Cows do not normally escape from their enclosure in
the absence of some negligence and that negligence
was defendant's.

2.

Plaintiff's own use of the instrumentality was not
the cause of the accident as he had no control over
any part of the loading procedure; and

3.

The defendants had exclusive control of loading
facilities which allowed this cow's escape.

(R.

634-638.)
Plaintiff accordingly requested instructions of res ipsa.
410, 411).

(R.

(See Plaintiff's Requested Instruction attached

hereto as Addendum 1.)

The trial court judge unjustifiably

refused the instructions.
The Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985), this court
relaxed the LSL§ i££S standard stating:
Something less than exclusive control of the
instrumentality causing damage may be sufficient if evidence demonstrates the probability
that defendant was responsible for damage.
Id. at 721.

Res ipsa may be used even where defendant claims not

to have knowledge of what caused plaintiff's injury.

Herein, as

in BallQw, defendants claim not to know exactly how the cow
escaped the corral, i.e. whether the wire came lose or broke (R.
11

591, 596, 598).

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the plaintiff, which is required in LS& ipsa cases, plaintiffs
was

entitled

to the

res

ipsa

instruction*

Anderton vs.

Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Dtah 1980) at 833.
Under similar facts, a sister court held that, although res
iefija loquitur did not apply to every case where a cow escapes from
an enclosed area and enters a public highway, the jury could
reasonably have concluded that cows normally could not escape from
the enclosure if the gate was securely locked.
642 P.2d 651 (OR 1982).

Watzig v. Tobin,

The court emphasized that:

[T]he conclusion which must be drawn to render
the doctrine applicable is not whether a cow
can escape such an enclosure, but rather
whether a jury reasonably could find, under
the evidence, that it is more probable than
not that the escape of the cow would not
normally occur in the absence of negligence
and that the negligence was that of the
defendant.
Id. at 655.

Interestingly, the court further held that plaintiff

would not need an expert to testify that these kinds of accidents
do not commonly happen in the absence of a defendants negligence.
Id. at 655.
In this case we have more evidence than the "mere" escape of
defendants1 cow.

We have evidence of a loading procedure which

was fraught with problems which allegedly caused the cow's
escape:

the uninspected bailing wire (R. 600); an ineffective

hook that will "pop off" when hit (R. 594, 595); a chute-trailer
not backed up to a chute (R. 557) ; the use of an inexperienced
16-year old boy to load (R. 602, 606).
12

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY REFUSING TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE.
The violation of a statutory duty or municipal ordinance
designed to protect a person claiming to be injured by reason of
its violation is negligence per se.
§239 (p. 622).

57 Am* Jur. 2d, Negligencer

The effect of establishing liability from breach

of such a statutory duty is that such liability may not be escaped
by proof that the breaching defendant has exercised due care.
In the exercise of its broad, general welfare powers, Salt
Lake County enacted a highway ordinance entitled, "Unattended
Animals on Highway Prohibited", Section 10-10-3.

This ordinance

in pertinent part is as follows:
Every person . . . herding . . . or allowing
to run at large, or causing to be . . .
herded . . . or allowed to run at large, any
. . . cow . . . upon any of the public
highways of the county shall be guilty of
misdemeanor.
(See ordinance in its entirety
as Addendum 2 hereto.)
The trial court judge erred in refusing plaintiff's instruction regarding the Salt Lake County ordinance, and negligence pex
,s.e. (R. 395, 397.)

These instructions were entirely substantiated

by the evidence in this case.

The defendants, by various state-

ments, admitted that after the cow had escaped and already run
across the public highway (2820 South) one time, they intended to
herd the cow back across 2820 South to Mr. Sutton1s property.

Mr.

Giblett was following the cow on foot to "return it to its home
corral11.

(R. 647.)

Defendants Mary and John Sutton "had separate
13

vehicles and drove along 2820 South Street prepared to herd the
animal back into the Sutton corral . . . ".

(Emphasis added.)

Kelly Nielsen, Mr. Sutton's 16-year-old helper, chased the cow
with Mr. Giblett.

(R. 602, 606.)

Mr. Sutton's intent was to

"direct the cow down the road" and back into his place (R.584)
through the gate which he intentionally left open for that purpose
(after the cow had escaped) (R. 581).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE A STRICT LIABILITY
INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE.
All courts adhere to the common principle of law that an
owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the
animal if the animal has a dangerous or vicious tendency, the
owner had knowledge of the animal's dangerous or vicious tendency,
such as would put a reasonable person on guard, and the owner
neglects to act to prevent the risk of damage.

Rest_atemen_t

(Second) of Tort, Section 509.
A cow is considered a "domestic" animal for purposes of
strict liability.

Vigue v. Noyes, 550 P.2d 234 (Az. 1976).

The

owner is "bound to keep such an animal secured at his peril
and the fact that it escapes does not relieve him from liabilities
inflicted."

(Emphasis added.)

££}• at 236.

One court considered

a horse to have a "propensity to be dangerous" when it bolted (two
times) when heading for an alfalfa field, thus throwing its rider.
Macho v. Mahowald, 374 NW2d 312 (Minn. App. 1985).

14

One previous incident of dangerous propensity is enough
to take a case involving injury, allegedly inflicted by an animal,
to the jury under the doctrine of harboring an animal with a
dangerous propensity.

Flynn v. Lindenfield, 433 P.2d 639 (AZ

1967) •
Based on these authorities, the trial court judge's refusal
to give the requested
reversible error,

instruction on strict liability was

(R. 411),

(See Plaintiff's Requested Instruc-

tion No. 25 attached hereto as Addendum 6.)

Even if the defend-

ants were not at fault for the escape of the cow, their knowledge
of its propensity to escape its confines renders them strictly
liable for harm to the plaintiff.

It was defendant Giblett's

testimony that he maintained all four sides of the LDS Church
pasture, and that it contained 81 head of cattle (R. 415), and
this was the first time he had had any cows escape from this LDS
Church property before this incident.

(R. 677.)

tiates that this "renegade" cow is abnormal.

This substan-

None of the wit-

nesses could fully explain how this cow escaped. (R. 624.)
it is inferred

from Mr. Giblett's insistence the fence was

properly maintained, that the cow must have jumped over it.
667, 624.)

But,

(R.

Mr. Giblett believed that this cow had jumped the

fence again after the accident.

(R. 666.)

Thus, the propensity of this particular animal to escape was
within the knowledge of the defendants.

In spite of its renegade

nature, they took no extra precautions to keep it confined during
loading.

Even immediately before the critical escape, Mr. Sutton
15

and Mr, Nielson, noticed

that the animal was nervous, running

about and excited, (R. 556, 608,)
Their lack of care is exemplified by the following:
(1)

The gate accessing the public highway was left open

(R. 553) ;

(2)

A chain link fencing which is inadequate to

contain cattle was used when alternatives such as a
solid piece of a gate blocked with a piece of board
could have been used.
(3)
when

Bailing wire twisted

it was

weaken.

(R. 705.);

known

four times was used as a latch

that twisting

(R. 708, 710, 712.)

the wire would
The more

logical

cause

it to

alternative

latching system should have been a chain.
(4)

They

relied

on leaning

the corral

gate against

the

trailer knowing that a cow hitting it would move it, allowing an
escape (R. 709); and
(4)

They allowed an inexperienced 16-year old to assist in

loading a skittish, 700-pound animal (R. 602, 606).
All of these facts support the appellant's contention that
the trial court should have given the strict liability instruction
as requested.
CONCLOSION
The jury verdict

in this case resulted from a number of

errors by the trial court each of which individually
reversible error.

constitute

Taken together, they also created an atmosphere

that deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial.
16

The fact that the jury

found defendant zero (0%) percent negligent under the facts of
this case, reflects the biased circumstances in which this
case was tried.

Appellant respectfully requests this Court to

reverse the judgment herein and remand this case for a new trial
with appropriate instructions to the trial court*
DATED this

day of May, 1986.
BLACK & MOORE

/James R. Black

&L
Mary A. Rudolph
LAURA L. BOYER

/

&

Laura L. Boyer
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ADDENDA
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ADDENDUM 1

INSTRUCTION

Our
loquitur

law

which

recognizes

means:

The

NO.

a

? V

doctrine

thing

speaks

known

for

of i t , u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o n e w h o
another
other
the

responsible

party

that

injury.

special

cow's

control

or

doctrine

the

of

law

may

Hornsby,

was

or

the

injury

in w h i c h

or

would

not

have

if t h o s e

securing

of t h e

who

Sutton

resulted

may

hold

of

that

the

caused

only

under

in

undone,

the

and

from

injury
and

Charles
some

to

the

exclusive

Gilett,

act or

maintained,

the

allowing

and

omission

tied,

tying/securing

and/or
of

said

gate.

incident

was

happened

have c o n t r o l

bailing

act

possession

care

the

things,

the

due

That

reason

conduct

applied

came

caused

defendants

b a i l i n g w i r e to t h e t r a i l e r

be

that

said

exercised

Second:

John

By

is i n j u r e d

the

ipsa

follows:

wire

in

res

itself.

exact

in m o t i o n

proximately

of t h e d e f e n d a n t s ,
that

the

set

bailing

which

James

in t h e m a n n e r
secured;

That

escape,

appears

not

showing

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e y b e i n g as

plaintiff,

it

caused

The

First:
the

without

as

wire

to

in

one of such n a t u r e as d o e s
the

of or are
the

corral

ordinary

course

of

r e s p o n s i b l e for the
gate,

use

ordinary

care.
Third:
the

That

occurrence

position

to

know

the

were
what

circumstances
such

that

specific

the

surrounding
plaintiff

conduct

or

act

the c a u s i n g
is
or

not

in

omission

of
a
or

failure

to a c t , w a s t h e c a u s e ,

those

in c h a r g e

of s e c u r i n g

gate,

m a y be r e a s o n a b l y

whereas

said

expected

the def^n^an*'*

bailing

wire

to k n o w ,

bem.3

to t h e corral

and thus to b e able

to e x p l a i n t h e i r lack of n e g l i g e n c e .
If

y o u find

all of t h e a b o v e

conditions

t h e y m a y g i v e r i s e -to an i n f e r e n c e by y o u that
John

Sutton

inference
absence

and

will
of

Charles

support

evidence

Gillett,

a verdict
of

were

negligent,

for the plaintiff,

non-negligence

on

exist,

the defendants,

t h e part

defendants.

White v, Pinney,

to

99 U. 484, 108 P2d 249 (1940)

which
in t h e
of t h e

ADDENDUM 2

Sec. 10-10-3. Unattended Animals on Highway
Prohibited*
Every person staking, tethering,
herding, grazing or pasturing, or allowing to
run at large or causing to be staked,
tethered, herded, grazed or pastured, or
allowed to run at large, any horse, cow,
mule, sheep, goat or swine, or other animal
upon any of the public highways of the county
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

ADDENDUM 3

tMSYHOCTlQH

are

You
Salt

Lake

instructed

that

(Sec. 10-10-3) provides

HO.

ff>

~~ ? r d i n a n c ?

of t h e C o u n t y of

that

or a l l o w i n g

herding,

s t o c k to r u n at l a r g e , o r c a u s e t o b e h e r d e d

or allowed

large

shall

upon

any p u b l i c

highway

of t h e C o u n t y ,

live-

to r u n at

be g u i l t y

of a

mi s d e m e a n o r »
The
Under

violation

the negligence

statute

gives

rise

of j u s t i f i c a t i o n
the

injury

of t h i s

ordinance

p e r se d o c t r i n e ,

to a p r e s u m p t i o n

or e x c u s e , p r o v i d e d

is a m e m b e r

is n e g l i g e n c e

the violation

of n e g l i g e n c e
that

of such

a

in t h e a b s e n c e

the plaintiff

of t h e c l a s s o f p e r s o n s

per se*

suffering

for whose

protec-

tion t h e statute was adopted, i.e. a motorist.
]f
this
was

County

yr»«» -'•p.-- ****
ordinance

a proximate

cause

just

»r»w r\-f t h ^ c* o f°ndant**
read

of i n j u r y

to y o u , and that
to J a m e s

that such v i o l a t i o n

was negligence, unless

by

of t h e e v i d e n c e

a preponderance

justification

that

Hornsby,

her 0 1 **
such

*/•»«-»! arort
violation

y o u will

find

such d e f e n d a n t ( s )

prove

s/he had an e x c u s e

or a

in n o t c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e C o u n t y

ordinance.

ADDENDUM 4

Undc~ "h~ County
necessary
the

cow

for you
to

run

to

at

ordinance

find

large

that
was

o r d i n a n c e p r o h i b i t s "every"
Under this
Sutton

and/or Mary

the

person

cow's

actions they

owner,

to y c - ,
herded,

11
or

because

is

allowed,

the

County

conduct.
the

fact

that

violated

the County

John

ordinance,

c o n s t i t u t e n e g l i g e n c e per se.

(1975).

rot

not own the cow in q u e s t i o n , if

v. W a s h i n g t o n Mineral

85 W a s h - 2d 166

who

ordinance, despite

Lee S u t t o n , did

t h e n that v i o l a t i o n will

^ead

p e r s o n from that

County

y o u find t h a t by t h e i r

Misterek

the

just

P r o d u c t s , 531 P2d 8 0 5 ,

ADDENDUM 5

INSTRUCTION

In
"allowing"
ness

or

the

County

ordinance

to run at large

such

negligent

NO.

implies

conduct

as

just

*f

read

knowledge,
is

to

you

consent,

equivalent

the
or

thereto

part of t h e o w n e r that t h e a n i m a l s be at l a r g e .

State v.

DP**\

^«

o?d 8<^ Q6 w 2 S h . ?d 652 ( 1 Q 8 1 ) •

phrase
willinon

the

ADDENDUM 6

INSTRUCTION
The
notice

owner/keeper

of

propensities

of

particular

propensities

peculiar

cause

less

class

insofar

to

animals
which

to the

as t h o s e

is

it

animal

bound

belongs

owner

dangerous
of

any

of

a domestic

propensities

propensity,

fault

on

will

his

animal,
be held

part,

for

Strict

liability

imposed

where the owner

causing

event,

that

on

has

the

the

animal

had

take

and

any

are l i k e l y
against

is

strictly

to

it.

aware

of

liable,

caused

he

one

regard-

to

another

propensity.

owner

reason

that

injuries

person as a result of this d a n g e r o u s

to

itself of which

i n j u r y , must e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e to guard
An

prior

:b

domestic

of

is put on n o t i c e , and

NO-

to

of

a cow or horse may

know,

Drior

a dangerous

to t h e

be

damaap-

propensity

abnor-

mal to its c l a s s .
If

you

find

that

the

defendants,

Sutton

and

Giblett,

k n e w of t h e d a n g e r o u s p r o p e n s i t y of t h i s c o w , i.e. its wild

nature

so

should

as to escape

be held

liable

its c o n f i n e s
for d a m a g e s

of t h e i r fault in allowing

and roam, then said d e f e n d a n t s
caused

by

the

escaped

said d a m a g e - c a u s i n g

cow,

regardless

escape.

Vigue v. No.yes, 550 P2d 2 3 4 , 113 Az 237 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; Flynn v.
L i n d e n f i e l d , 433 P2d 6 3 9 , 6 Az App 459 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; F e r n a n dez v- M a r k s , 642 P2d 5 4 2 , 3 H a w App 12 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .

ADDENDUM 7
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NOV 1 I F

Allen M. Swan, A3165
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

/ ' ' V \;,<\ Cis- y."ri
p<jlv Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES N. HORNSBY,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

vs.
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through
X, Inclusive,

Civil No. -G-&5^5QT3-

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

C % 3 - &d>/9

Defendants.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L. Boyer appearing
for plaintiff, Allen M. Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles
Giblett and Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton
and testimony having been adduced and argument of counsel
ion, McConkl*
A 8u«hn«<l
o*«a»on«i Cocootal*oo
3 0 S 300 PAST

|

(*QQ4£~

heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now
therefore it is hereby
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein
in the sum of $ 7 * ** ^ ^ ^ L
DATED this

f

V

.

_

day of Novemb

/ /

ATTEST
H. DtXON HtNDLBY
By

Doputv Clefk

day of November,

Served by mailing copies this

1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South,
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

//V&*.
A l l e n ' M . Swan

-2-

yy\y6>ujt^

ADDENDUM 8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES HORNSBY and
NANETTE MAILY HORNSBY, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
m

CIVIL NO. C-83-5019

vs .
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
:
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,
a Utah corporation, sole, et al.,"
Defendants.

:

The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the part of the
defendants asking the Court to dismiss the -claims for loss of
consortium, together with the defendant Church and Giblett's Motion
in Limine seeking to restrict evidence regarding an earlier
alleged negligent act came before the Court for hearing, together
with all parties Motion to Continue the Trial Date, and plaintiffs1
Motion to Amend.

The Court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their

Complaint to set forth additional claims of negligence, and to join
an additional party defendant.

The Court after discussion with

counsel also agreed to strike the trial date currently scheduled
for August 28, 1984, and continue this matter without trial date
until such time as one of the parties at their option files a
supplemental Certification of Readiness for Trial.

The Court

oool-

3pr:n3gf7TP*_

&T JUL,

* K 2 TWO

»«3W8rj«©C9f

DCCXS2CS1

granted the defendants' Motion regarding the plaintiffs1 claims for
loss of consortium, and took the question of defendants1 Motion in
Limine under advisement for further consideration.
Upon reviewing the file and considering carefully the issues
of proximate cause, independent intervening proximate cause, and
foreseeablility, the Court declines at this point in time to
grant the defendants1 Motion in Limine restricting evidence that may
pertain to alleged negligent conduct on the part of the defendant
Church regarding its fences approximately a month prior to the date
the animal in question escaped.

The Court is unable to rule as a

matter of law at the present time regarding the question of proximate
cause and foreseeability, keeping in mind that such issues are
normally reserved for a jury in cases of negligence such as the one
before the Court.
Counsel for the plaintiffs is to prepare an Order setting forth
the Court's decision as contained in this Memorandum Decision
dealing with plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend, the continuance of the
trial date, and the defendants1 Motion in Limine.

Counsel for the

defendant Church is requested to prepare any<5rder setting forth the
Court's ruling dismissing the plaintiffs/ claim for loss of consortium
lis
Dated this

JL/ J

day of July, 1/84

^IMCTHY^R. HANSON
)ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H.WXONHINW*'

^ J t l *———5^7c*rtT
i - . n O ! c-

n a e r a m mjs&rr*.

*rr

A^.

?AGS

gwHauE.

HHMOHAJcmrH

DSCISIOH

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

/ O day of July, 1984:

Laura L. Boyer
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3167 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Allen M. Swan
Attorney for Defendant
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen G. Morgan
Attorney for Defendant Sutton
261 East 300 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^MA^Jy^f^^

